Introduction
Numerous empirical studies nd that liquidity matters for asset returns. On the theoretical side, there is however little agreement on what aspects of liquidity can generate large crosssectional eects in asset returns. A number of theoretical models use the concept of expected holding period to link liquidity to asset prices. 1 While such theories concern expected holding periods, empirical studies typically employ proxies of investor holding periods constructed from turnover. In the present paper we use data on actual holding periods to take a closer empirical look at holding periods and how this is related to stock liquidity and asset prices.
We look at three issues. First, we describe individual holding period decisions, and evaluate the determinants of these decisions. Second, we ask to what degree typical proxies of holding periods measure actual holding periods. Third, we consider asset pricing, and ask whether the observed empirical link between liquidity and asset prices can be explained by liquidity being a proxy for holding period.
The source of our contribution is an access to the complete holdings for all investors at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over a 10 year period. 2 Our ability to measure holding periods from data on actual trading decisions at the level of individual investors, observed over a substantial period of time, is quite exceptional. To our knowledge ours is also the rst paper to use duration analysis in this context, which is the proper econometric framework for analyzing questions about the length of time an investor chooses to keep his or her stake in a company.
The standard way of incorporating market frictions into asset pricing models is to assume that trading involves some exogenous trading cost (or illiquidity cost). 3 This implies that investors' expected holding period is crucial for the eect of illiquidity on required returns, i.e. the more often investors plan to trade, the more important are the trading costs. The importance of illiquidity costs therefore depends on the assumed structure of holding periods in a model. The simplest assumption possible is that the expected holding period is exogenous and identical for all investors. Assuming risk neutrality, these assumptions imply that the required return on assets is equal to the risk free rate plus the per period percentage transaction cost, see Amihud et al. (2005) . 4 In the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , risk neutral investors are assumed to have dierent exogenous holding periods and limited capital. These assumptions introduce a clien-tele eect into the solution whereby investors with long expected holding periods select stocks with high trading costs. The required return will then dier for dierent classes of investors, and the expected gross return becomes an increasing and concave function of the relative transaction cost. Amihud and Mendelson nd empirical support for this hypothesis using spreads and stock returns from the NYSE over the 1961-80 period. 5 On the other hand, more realistic models with endogenous holding periods and risk averse investors nd that an exogenous liquidity cost has only miniscule eects on the level of asset returns. In a continuous-time model with exogenous asset prices, Constantinides (1986) shows that the optimal investment policy for risk averse investors involves a trade o between high trading costs from frequent portfolio rebalancing and utility costs from having a suboptimal asset allocation. While trading costs have a rst-order eect on the demand for the asset, they only have a second-order eect on equilibrium asset returns. Vayanos (1998) extends this analysis to a general equilibrium model with endogenous holding periods. A calibration of the model gives a similar result; the eects of trading costs on equilibrium asset returns are small. Hence, we have the intriguing result that more realistic models assuming risk aversion and endogenous holding periods seem to do considerably worse in explaining empirical ndings than less realistic models with risk neutrality and exogenous holding periods.
Huang (2003) notes that an important reason behind the discrepancy between theory and empirical ndings regarding the eect of liquidity on asset prices is that asset pricing models in general cannot explain the observed high market trading volume. The strong dependence of liquidity premia on investor holding periods implies that theories that cannot account for observed high trading volume cannot explain observed liquidity premia either. In a model with uncertain exogenous holding periods, Huang shows that the premium for liquidity risk can be large if investors face liquidity shocks and are constrained from borrowing. 6 Another and potentially related explanation is the restriction in asset pricing models that liquidity costs are exogenous. The market microstructure literature divides market frictions into asymmetric information costs and coordination costs (inventory risk and search problems), and shows that prices can diverge from long-term equilibrium values due to strategic trading behavior of investors. Thus, models that do not specify the ultimate source of trading cost dierences cannot really explore how a full equilibrium will look like. For instance it is not obvious that investors with long expected holding periods will select stocks with high trading costs since holding \long term" stocks reduces the value of the option to sell the stocks early.
5 Several other papers attempt to test the model using turnover as a proxy for holding period. Atkins and Dyl (1997) nd evidence consistent with the spread-holding period relationship using the inverse of turnover as a proxy for the average holding period. Datar, Naik, and Radclie (1998) show that turnover is negatively related to stock returns in the cross-section, while Hu (1997) nds support for both an increasing and concave return-holding period relationship using data on returns and turnover from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In the empirical test of their liquidity-adjusted CAPM, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) nd a signicant eect on prices from liquidity cost, also using turnover as proxy for investors average holding periods. 6 Introducing additional motives for trade, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) also nd that the liquidity premium can be large when investors have high frequency trading needs.
Obviously, more knowledge about how and why expected holding periods dier among investors is highly valuable. However, it has so far been hard to investigate these questions empirically. While some attempts have been made they all suer from lack of data on actual holding periods. Instead they rely on estimates of holding period using data on stock turnover, which may not be a good proxy. Even though a high-turnover stock necessarily have many of the stock's investors buying and selling the stock, it is by no means certain that all owners of the stock have short holding periods. The stock may have a group of very long holding period owners, but high turnover among the remaining investors. The core of this problem is that turnover is a characteristic of a stock, while holding period is a decision made by individual investors. Thus, turnover may be linked to returns and spreads for other reasons than through its correlation with holding period. It is therefore an interesting empirical question to what degree turnover and holding period are related.
In our analysis we consider several issues. First we study holding periods at the level of individual investors. The typical holding period is found to be about one year, but the probabilities of liquidating an equity position, conditional on the length of time the ownership has lasted, shows considerable time variation. Relative to existing evidence, holding periods seem shorter than previously thought. We also ask what determines the holding period of individual investors and nd that typical measures of liquidity, such as the bid ask spread and turnover, are important determinants. We also nd clear dierences in average holding periods across investor types.
Second, to the extent that alternative measures of liquidity reects holding period, it is interesting to relate actual holding period data to other extant measures of holding periods and liquidity in the literature. We both compare actual holding period estimates to alternatives provided in the literature, and investigate the extent to which, in the cross-section of equities, holding periods and liquidity measures covary. To do such comparisons it is necessary to construct a measure of average holding period at the stock level.
If the relationship between liquidity and asset returns reects a compensation for exogenous trading costs, then investors' expected holding periods should also be able to explain the crosssection of stock returns. We look at this issue in the third part of the paper. While the average holding period measure is related to other measures of liquidity in the expected directions (e.g. positively to spread and negatively to turnover), it does a worse job in explaining the cross-section of stock returns than more standard measures of liquidity. There may be several explanations for this result. Our measure of average holding period may not be measuring the salient features of holding period. 7 Alternatively, the more standard measures of liquidity may be reecting more than just an exogenous cost of trading. They may for example reect information risk.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the market and the data set. In 7 We may not be capturing the \marginal investor" which is important for pricing.
4 section 2 we investigate the individual owners' holding period decisions. In section 3 we see how our actual holding periods compare to alternative proxies for holding periods suggested in the literature. We also relate holding periods to standard measures of liquidity. In section 4 we compare the asset pricing implications of holding period measures and liquidity measures. Section 5 concludes.
Market and Data
The rms in the sample are listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), which is a moderately sized exchange by international standards. In 1997 (about the midpoint of our sample), the 217 listed rms had an aggregate market capitalization which ranked the OSE twelfth among the 21 European stock exchanges for which comparable data is available. The number of companies on the exchange has increased from 141 in 1989 to 212 in 2003. For some information about the structure of the Norwegian Stock Market we refer to Bhren and degaard (2000 Bhren and degaard ( , 2001 Bhren and degaard ( ), degaard (2007 , and Ns, Skjeltorp, and degaard (2007) . This paper uses monthly data from the Norwegian equity market for the period 1992:12 to 2003:6. From the Norwegian Securities Registry (VPS) we have monthly observations of the equity holdings of the complete stock market. At each date we observe the number of stocks owned by every owner. Each owner has a unique identier which allow us to follow the owners' holdings over time. For each owner the data include a sector code that allows us to distinguish between such types as mutual fund owners, nancial owners (which include mutual funds), industrial (nonnancial corporate) owners, private (individual) owners, state owners and foreign owners. In addition to this anonymous data set, we use public reports on individual owners inside transactions to construct measures of insider ownership. 8 A third data source is the Oslo Stock Exchange Data Service (OBI). This source provides stock prices and accounting data. Finally, we use interest rate data from Norges Bank, the Central Bank of Norway.
What affects holding periods for individual investors?
In this section, we use duration analysis to describe actual holding periods and to study what variables might aect holding period decisions. By investigating if the spread is an important determinant of investors' holding periods, we are the rst to perform a direct test of the spreadholding period relationship in Amihud and Mendelson (1986) . 9
Duration analysis
The econometric framework suited for analyzing questions about the length of time an investor chooses to keep his or her stake in a company, and what economic factors aect this decision, is duration (or survival) analysis. In duration analysis, one models the decision to terminate a relationship. In economics, such methods are used on e.g. labor market data to analyze determinants of the time spent unemployed, in which case the pertinent termination is movement between employment and unemployment. 10 Here, we analyze the decision of an individual investor to buy equity in a particular company, where termination is the decision to liquidate the equity holding in that company.
Duration analysis involves estimation of the probability distribution of the termination decision. This probability distribution can be characterized in a number of ways, for example by the survival function; the probability of surviving beyond a given date, or the hazard function; the probability of termination, conditional on having survived so far. The most common way of characterizing the probability distribution is through the hazard function, and modeling the hazard function directly has been shown to be the best way of estimating duration data.
A particular concern in duration analysis is the truncation problem. In our setting, the truncation problem stems from the fact that we only observe investors for a limited period of time. Figure 1 illustrates the problem. It is only the holding period of investor A which will be measured correctly. The holding period of investor B will be right truncated, all we see is that the investor was present at the last date, we do not know the nal termination date. For investor C we correctly observe the terminal date, but we do not observe when the relationship is initiated, which is termed left truncation. The estimation of the hazard function is done adjusting for the right truncation problem.
Estimated hazard and survival functions
We apply duration analysis to the holding periods of individual investors using monthly data for all investors at the OSE over the period 1992-2003. To reduce noise investors with less than ve hundred shares are removed from the sample. Thus, we count as initiation the rst time an investor is observed holding 500 or more shares, and termination when he or she reduces the stake to less than 500 shares. 11 This leaves about 1.4 million observations of investorcompany durations. 12 Using these observations we estimate the hazard function of holding periods. Figure 2 illustrates estimated survival and hazard function for the complete sample of investors.
From the unconditional probabilities of surviving we can see that the median holding period is less than one year. This is found where the survival function crosses the 0.5 line. Other interesting properties of the holding period are better illustrated by the estimated hazard function, shown in the right panel of gure 2.
If the probabilities of liquidating an equity position, conditional on the length of time the ownership has lasted, are time independent, the hazard function will be at. This is not the case in our sample. Instead, we see a clear and systematic time variation. The conditional probability of exit starts around 0.45, increasing to a maximum slightly above 0.5 around 1 year, and then decreases steadily, reaching 0.2 after 8 years, and keeps decreasing. The decreasing part of the curve after 1 year means that if an owner has held the stock for one year, he or she is less and less likely to terminate as time passes. The high probability of exit at the short horizon is the prime contributor to stock turnover. Over the same time period, the average annual stock turnover was about 60%.
It should be mentioned that there are some problems with the analysis at the very short end, induced by the fact that the minimum possible observation of holding period is one month. Since we only have monthly observations of holding period our minimal estimate of holding period is one month, found when we have only two consecutive observations of stock holdings. 13
Determinants of the hazard function
Having described holding periods we now turn to investigating what variables might aect the holding period decision. Duration analysis let us ask this question by estimating the eect of a variable on the hazard function. In the standard specication of duration analysis, the hazard function is a constant function of the explanatory variables. In our analysis we will use time-varying explanatory variables such as rm size, stock volatility and spread. To implement estimation we use the observed values of an explanatory variable at the time when a stake is rst entered into as the input to the estimation. In economic terms this can be viewed as the holding period decision being based on observable variables when the stake is rst acquired.
By including spread as an explanatory variable, we perform a direct test of the spreadholding period relationship in Amihud and Mendelson (1986) . Earlier empirical analysis, such as Atkins and Dyl (1997) , test this relationship using turnover as a proxy for holding period. Our paper improves on this analysis in two respects. First, we base the analysis on actual holding periods at the individual investor level. Second, we use the correct econometric framework for testing. The question of whether spread aects holding periods should be asked by testing whether the spread at the time when the stock position is entered into aects the hazard for holding periods. For comparison, we will in the next section perform a similar test using turnover as an alternative measure of liquidity.
In Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , investors coming to the market have dierent expected holding periods. One rationale for this assumption could be that dierent groups of investors have distinct dierent trading motives, for instance long term pension saving versus short term speculation. It is also possible that an investor's planned holding period is inuenced by the size of the investment. To account for these possibilities we also include owner type and investment amount as explanatory variables. We use dummy variables for four owner types; nancial, foreign, individual and non-nancial (corporate) owners. To avoid multi-collinearity we do not include a dummy for the last owner category, state owners. Since we only have monthly observations of holdings, we estimate the investment amount as the stock price at the end of the month multiplied with the number of shares. To avoid numerical diculties we use the log of the investment.
In panel A of table 1 we show the results from estimating the contributions to the hazard function of the variables at the owner level, and two dierent liquidity measures, relative spread (columns 2-3) and turnover (columns 4-5). Let us rst look at the estimated relationship between spread and holding period. The coecients in the table measures contributions to the hazard function. If a coecient equals one it does not contribute. If a coecient is less than one it lowers the conditional probability of exit. If a coecient is less than one it therefore implies a longer holding period. As seen in the table, the coecient is signicantly below one. We therefore conrm the posited relationship between spread and holding period. Stocks with high spreads tend to have longer holding periods.
The other variables in the regressions are all signicant. The amount invested has a negative eect on the hazard function. This means that larger owners tend to have longer holding periods. The coecient is very close to one, though, so the magnitude of the eect seems small. The analysis also shows clear dierences across investor types in average holding periods. Financial owners are the shortest term, while individual owners have the longest holding periods. Foreign and non-nancial (corporate) owners have holding periods in between these two extremes.
Atkins and Dyl (1997) include logs of stock volatility and rm size as explanatory variables in their estimation of determinants of holding period. In panel B of table 1 we show the results when these two variables are added for two dierent analyzes of determinants of the hazard function, one using the spread as a liquidity measure, the other using turnover. In both specications volatility and rm size are signicantly related to holding period. The holding periods tend to be shorter in rms with high volatility and large size.
Proxies of holding periods
The literature has considered a number of empirical measures of holding periods, and argued that liquidity proxies for holding periods. It is therefore of interest to see to what extent such usage is justied. We use our data on holding periods to shed light on this issue in two 8 ways. First, we look at a measure of individual owner holding periods suggested by Atkins and Dyl (1997) . We show that their measure seriously overstates actual holding periods of individual investors. Second, we consider ranking of the cross-section of equities by measures of holding periods, and ask to what extent this ranking is related to the rankings suggested by liquidity measures used to proxy for holding period. To perform such an analysis it is necessary to construct a measure that aggregates individual holding periods into a measure of holding periods at the stock level.
Other estimates of individual owners holding periods
The best known estimate of individual owners' holding periods is from Atkins and Dyl (1997) . Atkins and Dyl estimate the average holding period as the number of shares outstanding divided by number of stocks traded per year, which is the inverse of annual turnover. Based on a sample of US rms, they estimate an average (median) holding period of 6.99 (3.38) for NASDAQ rms and 4.01 (2.43) for NYSE rms. Table 2 shows the results when we calculate the same estimate of holding period for our sample of stocks. Compared to duration analysis, the method based on turnover seriously overstates average holding period. The Atkins and Dyl method gives an estimated mean holding period of 3.33. As illustrated by the histogram, the distribution of estimates is very skewed, though, so the median of 1.96 years is a better indication of the typical holding period. This can be compared to the results shown in the survival function of gure 2, which puts the average holding period at about one year.
Atkins and Dyl (1997) also investigate whether liquidity, as measured by the bid ask spread, is important for (their estimate of) holding period. We replicate their study for our data, with the resulting estimates shown in table 3. This estimation conrms the positive relation between holding periods and spreads, stocks with higher spreads tend to have longer holding periods.
What is the relationship between holding periods and measures of liquidity?
We now shift focus from the holding period of individual owners to holding periods as an aggregate property of all the owners of a stock. The impetus for these analyzes comes from the empirical asset pricing evidence of a positive relationship between asset prices and microstructure measures of liquidity. If liquidity is an exogenous trading cost, as assumed in the theoretical asset pricing literature, then the link between liquidity and asset prices must be one of cost compensation. This cost compensation will vary with investors' expected holding period. We therefore want to investigate whether liquidity co-vary with holding periods as such theories suggest. To investigate this we need a measure of average holding period at the stock level.
An index of average holding period at the stock level
To get a measure of holding period that we can relate to measures of stock liquidity, that are measured over short time intervals, we construct a holding period index. The measure is constructed as a \snapshot", where we take the owners at a given date, measure the holding period for each owner, and aggregate these individuals into one measure per stock. To lessen time series overlap we truncate the measurement interval to one year at a time. 14 Figure 3 illustrates our method for creating the index. At a given date t we use data for the holdings in the previous year. We take all owners with an equity stake at time t. 15 In the gure it means that we use owners 1, 3 and 4. Owner 2 has sold out her stake 6 months before, and is not present in the company at date t. The holding period index for each owner is the holding period in fractions of a year. The index for the company is a weighted sum of the individual owners' indices. In the example in gure 3 the holding period index is hpi = w 1 1 + w 3 7 12 + w 4 3 12
; where w i is the weight for owner i. The weight for each individual can vary. If we want to put more weight on the large owners we use value weights where the fraction of the company held by each owner at time t is the weight. This index is termed hpi(vw). If we are more interested in the typical owner we use equal weights 1=n, where n is the number of owners in the sample at time t. This index is termed hpi(ew). We calculate holding period indices for each equity in the sample. We do it for both the equally weighted index hpi(ew) and the value weighted index hpi(vw). Figure 4 shows the distribution of the two.
Note the dierence between the value weighted and equally weighted. That the value weighted index is more concentrated on the longer period must be caused by the larger owners tending to stay longer. This suggests a tendency that large owners have longer holding periods than small owners.
What determines the holding period indices?
A simple way of evaluating how the holding period index varies with other rm properties is by stratifying the sample of rms based on the characteristic we want to investigate, and calculate averages for each group.
Panel A of table 4 implements this for a number of dierent rm characteristics: rm size, stock volatility, book-to-market (B/M) ratio, rm age, insider ownership and ownership concentration. The average holding periods seem higher for the smallest and largest quartiles 14 All holding periods above 1 are therefore truncated. One way to think about this is that we say any holding period more than one year is \long term," without distinguishing further. This is justied by the results on individual owners, where more than half of the owners had holding period of less than one year. 15 To reduce noise we require that the number of shares is above a threshold of 500 shares.
of the rms. A similar pattern is true for volatility. The average holding period for value stocks (high B/M) seems to be longer than the average holding period for growth stocks. Firm age also seems important, the older the rm, the longer the average holding period. The last two variables, insider ownership and ownership concentration, shows no obvious systematic patterns.
To more formally test the importance of the explanatory variables, we also run a multivariate regression for each of the two holding period indices. Panel B of table 4 shows the results for this estimation. Old rms and value stocks tend to have owners with longer average holding periods than young rms and growth stocks. Surprisingly, we nd a negative coecient on the rm size (though only signicant for the equally weighted index). Thus, we nd weak evidence that larger rms have shorter duration than smaller rms. This nding is at odds with the evidence in Atkins and Dyl (1997) as well as with several suggested explanations for the opposite result that large rms should have long duration owners than smaller rms (including less risk, reduced divergence of investors' expectations, and less need for portfolio rebalancing due to more stable return distribution parameters). The two variables thought to be related to asymmetric information, stock volatility and insider ownership, do not seem to explain rms' average holding period. Finally, the size of the largest owner does seem important; the larger this owner, the longer the average holding period.
The relation between holding period index and other liquidity measures
We now turn to the question of to what degree liquidity proxies for holding periods. We look at a number of liquidity measures, and compare these liquidity measures to the holding period indices we just calculated. We look at the covariability of these measures, and compare the properties of liquidity, such as liquidity's determinants, to similar estimations for holding period indices.
We consider three dierent measures of liquidity: turnover, relative spread, and amortized spread. The turnover and relative spread are standard measures, and will not be discussed further. The amortized spread is particularly interesting for our purposes, as it attempts to measure an expected cost of trading equity that takes into account the holding period of a position. As such it can be viewed as an attempt to make trading costs across stocks comparable by looking at expected costs over a dened time interval, such as a year. The amortized spread measure was introduced in Chalmers and Kadlec (1998), and is roughly equal to the bid ask spread multiplied with the turnover. 16
16 Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) A in table 5 shows stratied averages of holding period indices. We see that stocks with low turnover have longer holding period indices and that holding period is increasing in the spread. These observations are conrmed by the correlation coecients in panel B of the table. All the coecients have the expected signs. In the cross-section, the correlation between turnover and the holding period indices are around 0:5. This shows that turnover is only an imperfect measure of holding period. Interestingly, the amortized spread has a very low correlation with the holding period indices. However, when we look at the quartiles of hpi there seems to be some systematic covariation between hpi and amortized spread.
To further investigate the links between the holding period indices and the liquidity measures we analyze the determinants of turnover and spreads in the same way as we did for the holding period indices, cf table 4. The results from this analysis are presented in table 6. As the tables show, the liquidity variables seem to have similar determinants as the holding period indices; rm size, B/M ratio, and the largest owner are all signicant determinants of both turnover and spread.
We also show, in table 7, results from adding liquidity variables to the series of explanatory variables used in the regressions presented in panel B of table 4. The liquidity variables are clearly signicant determinants of the holding period indices, but most of the other variables are still signicant.
The role of holding period for asset pricing
In this section we look at the dierences between liquidity and holding period in a more indirect manner. It has been shown that microstructure variables such as the bid/ask spread and turnover are important determinants of stock returns in the cross section. In some papers, such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , it is argued that this is because the microstructure variables are proxying for holding period. If this is the case we should nd that our holding period indices explain the cross-section of stock returns better than the variables argued to proxy for holding period.
In table 8 we show the results for two dierent analyzes of the cross section of stock returns. We rst look a portfolio sorts. We sort the stocks into portfolios based on ve criteria: Turnover, bid/ask spread, amortized spread, and the two holding period indices hpi(ew) and hpi(vw). for both turnover and in particular bid/ask spread there is a clear relation between the level of the liquidity variable and excess returns.
We conrm this impression by two asset pricing investigations in a Fama and MacBeth (1973) framework. In the rst we add a microstructure variable to stock beta, i.e. we ask whether a microstructure variable has additional explanatory power to the CAPM. Of the four alternative specications the more convincing ones are those using spread measures, not the holding period indices. The same pattern is apparent in panel C, where we also include the Fama and French (1992) variable rm size. 17 With this two factor specication neither of the liquidity nor holding period measures have any additional explanatory power, which may be due to the correlation between rm size and liquidity/holding periods.
Conclusion
Our paper is the rst to use a data set of the complete holdings of all investors in a stock market to look at expected holding periods for individual investors. We show how these decisions of individual investors sum up to a measure of average holding periods at the stock level, and the links between stock liquidity, holding periods, and asset returns.
We make a number of important contributions to the literature. First, in our analysis of the holding period decisions of individual investors, we show that liquidity is an important determinant of holding periods for individual investors. We show that, controlling for various aspects of investor type and importance, low liquidity (high bid/ask spread and/or low turnover) of a stock when the investor enters into a stock position, tends to result in longer holding periods.
Current empirical literature on the links between holding periods and asset returns has used (the inverse of) turnover at the stock level as a proxy for expected holding periods for the individual investors of the stock (Atkins and Dyl, 1997). Based on the nding that the correlation coecient between turnover and holding period indices constructed from data on actual holding periods lies around 0:5, we argue that turnover is only an imperfect measure of expected holding periods. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that the link between transaction costs (spreads) and returns works through investors' selection of stocks based on their expected holding periods. If this is the case we should see that average holding periods for investors in a stock are important determinants of the cross-section of stock returns. However, when we run a horse-race between our measures of average holding and more traditional measures of liquidity, such as the spread, as determinants of the cross-section of stock returns, we nd that holding period is only weakly related to asset returns, while the more traditional liquidity measures, spread and turnover, are strongly related to asset returns.
While our results are still preliminary, there are some interesting avenues for further research. As discussed in the introduction, the Amihud and Mendelson model does not explain why there is a spread, just that dierent spreads can be sustainable when investors select stocks with dierent spreads based on their expected holding periods. A more complete model would also incorporate the cause of liquidity (spread) dierences. A typical microstructure model would attribute these causes to information risk. We nd that liquidity strongly aect holding periods. At the same time, we nd little evidence of a link between holding periods and returns, and a strong link between returns and traditional microstructure liquidity variables. A possible explanation for these results is that the cause of the rst eect is the Amihud and Mendelson intuition, investors reacting to spreads, while returns and microstructure liquidity is linked through the cause of spread dierences. Trying to disentangle these eects seems a promising direction to go. The gure illustrates some conceptual problems in our estimation of holding periods using monthly observations. In calendar time our sample starts in 1992:12 and ends in 2003:6. We illustrate the holding periods of 3 example investors, A, B and C. For investor A the holding period is contained within 1992{2003, and therefore estimated correctly. For investor B we correctly observe the initial date but as the investor keeps his stake till after the last date, all we know is that we observe the stake on the last date. The holding period of this owners is underestimated due to right truncation. For owner C we correctly observe the terminal date, but since we do not observe the rst date, only that this owner was present in the rst date of the sample, in 1992:12. The holding period is underestimated due to left truncation. The gure illustrates our method for creating an holding period index. We illustrate four example owners, 1{4. We look at all owners during the year, and calculate each owner's holding period in fractions of the year. For owner 1 the holding period is 1, for owner 2 it is 5/12, for owner 3 it is 7/12, and for owner 4 it is 3/12. An holding period index is calculated at time t. We only use the owners present at time t, and calculate the weighted average of holding periods for the individual owners as hpi = w11 + w3 7 12 + w4 3 12 . We use two dierent weights. The rst is equal weights. The resulting index is denoted hpi(ew). The second is value weights, each owner receive weights based on the faction of the company that owner holds at date t. The resulting index is denoted hpi(vw). Histograms of the holding period indices hpi(ew) and hpi(vw). The indices are calculated for each company at year end. The variables hpi(ew) and hpi(vw) are averages of holding period length at the stock level calculated over a period of one year by taking all owners observed at the nal date and taking the average holding period over the period for these owners. The index hpi(ew) is an equally weighted average and the index hpi(vw) is a value weighted average. The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6. 0.12
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The table shows results of estimation of the regression (1) in the system of equations dened by the two equations (1) and (2) below.
HldP er iT = 1 + 1Spread iT + 2MktV al iT + 3V arRet iT
Spread iT = 2 + 1HldP er iT + 2MktV al iT + 3V arRet iT
The estimation is done using 2SLS with lagged spread (Spread i;T 1 ) as an instrument for the spread (Spread i;T ). In this specication we follow the notation of Atkins and Dyl (1997) , where HldP er is the log of their estimate of holding period, the inverse of the annual turnover, Spread is the relative bid ask spread, MktV al the log of the market value of the rm, and V arRet the log of the average daily variance of stock returns. We here perform a number of cross-sectional investigations of asset prices. In Panel A we show excess returns of 10 portfolios sorted on either an holding period index (hpi) or a liquidity measure. For each stock we calculate the hpi indices and the two liquidity measures annual turnover and average relative bid/ask spread. We then use these numbers to group the stocks into 10 portfolios. The table describes the excess returns of these 10 portfolios, i.e. returns in excess of the risk free interest rate. Panel B and C shows results for a number of dierent Fama and MacBeth (1973) specications. In panel B we add liquidity variables and holding period variables to the CAPM, in panel C we add them to the a two factor model. Each of the tables describing Fama MacBeth analysis describes four dierent specications (I) to (V). The variables hpi(ew) and hpi(vw) are averages of holding period length at the stock level calculated over a period of one year by taking all owners observed at the nal date and taking the average holding period over the period for these owners. The index hpi(ew) is an equally weighted average and the index hpi(vw) is a value weighted average. Stock Beta: Beta is calculated using ve years of monthly data, Turnover : Number of shares traded in the stock during one year divided by number of shares outstanding, Bid/Ask spread: Relative bid/ask spread (Pa P b )=Pt, averaged over a year and Amorized Spread: . The analysis uses monthly data from the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992:12 to 2003:6.
